Company
AO World
Ticker
AO.
Probability
50%
Value Opportunity
−28.4%
17 June 2026 · FY 2026 Results (year ending 31 March 2026)
VerdictSELL

Caught Between Currys and Amazon

AO World — the UK's largest online-only electricals retailer, now also running the Music Magpie recommerce business. All figures in pounds sterling.

Briefing

FY 2026 Headline Results

AO World has produced final results for the year ending 31 March 2026. Revenue was up 11.4%. Adjusted profit before tax was up 16.1% to a record £50.5m — which comes as quite a surprise to me. Significantly, the statutory profit before tax was also £50.5m: there were no adjusting items at all this year, compared with negative £22.9m of adjusting items in last year's figures. That is surprisingly good. The adjusted pre-tax margin was 4%, closing in on the medium-term target of 5%. Reported earnings per share stands at 6.36p.

FY 2026 results

MetricFY 2026FY 2025Change
Revenuec.£1,266m£1,137.5m+11.4%
Adjusted pre-tax profit£50.5m£43.5m+16.1%
Statutory pre-tax profit£50.5m£29m (after adj.)No adj. items FY26
Adjusting items£0(£22.9m)—
Adjusted pre-tax margin4%c.3.8%Toward 5% target
Operating profit£49.4m£21.1m+134%
Reported earnings per share6.36p1.6pSharp rise
Net funds (was net debt)+£16.4m(£35.9m)Swing to net cash
Net asset value£175.5m£144.5m+21.4%

Sources: AO World FY26 final results, 17 Jun 2026; DirectorsTalk; GlobalData; Investegate. FY25 adjusting items were £3.3m Music Magpie acquisition costs plus a £19.5m goodwill/intangible impairment on the postpay mobile business (£22.8m total).

Is This a Clean Result?

The single biggest reason the statutory comparison looks so dramatic is the absence of the prior year's adjusting items. In FY 2025 there were £22.8m of one-off charges (£3.3m of Music Magpie acquisition costs and a £19.5m impairment of goodwill and intangibles on the postpay mobile business). In FY 2026 there were none. So statutory profit before tax swung from a heavily-charged £29m to a clean £50.5m — but a large part of that swing is the non-repeat of last year's write-downs rather than pure trading improvement.

That said, the underlying trading genuinely improved too: adjusted pre-tax profit (which already strips out those one-offs in both years) still rose 16.1%, and the operating profit jump from £21.1m to £49.4m reflects revenue growth with broadly stable margins and well-controlled administrative costs. So it is a real improvement — but the headline statutory leap in earnings per share overstates it, because the prior year was depressed by impairments.

🎓 Clarity "Adjusting items", statutory vs adjusted profit — what's the difference? Statutory profit is the official, all-in figure under accounting rules. Adjusted profit strips out one-off items the company considers non-recurring — things like acquisition costs or write-downs (impairments) on assets that have lost value. Last year, AO took £22.8m of such one-off charges, which crushed its statutory profit. This year there were none, so statutory profit leapt — but a lot of that "growth" is simply the absence of last year's bad items, not the business earning more. That's why reported earnings per share rocketed from 1.6p to 6.36p while the cleaner "adjusted" measure rose a more modest 16%.

Margins and Cost Control

The operating profit jumped 134% to £49.4m while revenue grew to around £1,266m. Gross margin was held broadly stable — 24.26% in FY 2025 and around 24.95% in FY 2026 — so they kept margins steady while growing gross profit. Critically, they did not take on major additional administrative costs: administrative expenses moved only modestly, from 20.64% of sales to 21.05%. Effectively, admin costs (a big cost for the business) didn't rise as fast as sales, so scale mattered. The Music Magpie acquisition does appear to be playing through positively.

Music Magpie and Segmented Revenue

One of the big revenue-driving areas has been the Music Magpie recommerce business, where e-commerce sales grew around 118% to £119.5m. That reflects the first full year of ownership (Music Magpie was acquired in December 2024, so FY 2025 only captured a partial-year contribution).

Segment picture (FY 2026)

SegmentDetailDirection
B2C Retail (core ao.com)Largest segment; major/small domestic appliances, AV, mobile, laptops+c.9.5%
Recommerce (Music Magpie)Trade-in / refurbishment; e-commerce sales c.£119.5m+c.118%
B2BElectricals and installation at scaleDeclined (rationalised)
Third-party logistics / networkLogistics and network commissionLower

Sources: AO World FY26 results; GlobalData (B2C c.9.5%; B2B and network commission declined as the group rationalised for profitability); AIM Group (FY25 recommerce c.£42.6m).

Stripping Out Music Magpie — the Real Picture

To answer how much of the growth is real versus acquisition-driven, the cleanest cut is to strip Music Magpie entirely out of both years. It contributed only around £29.7m in FY 2025 (acquired 12 December 2024, so just under four months of ownership) against around £119.5m in FY 2026:

Revenue excluding Music Magpie

MetricFY 2026FY 2025
Group revenue (reported)c.£1,267m£1,137.5m
Less: Music Magpie(£119.5m)(£29.7m)
Revenue ex-Music Magpiec.£1,147.7mc.£1,107.8m
Ex-Music Magpie growth+3.6%—

Where the growth really came from (£m)

Source: AO World FY25 and FY26 results. The core business (navy) barely moved — up just 3.6%. Almost all the headline growth is the Music Magpie slice (gold) ballooning as a four-month contribution annualises into a full year. That tailwind won't repeat in FY 2027.

On this basis, the group grew only around 3.6% once Music Magpie is removed — versus the 11.4% headline. The roughly £90m increase in Music Magpie revenue is almost entirely the mechanical effect of annualising a four-month acquisition into a full twelve months. It will not repeat: once FY 2027 carries a full year of Music Magpie in both comparison periods, that tailwind disappears, and growth reverts to whatever the core engine and a now-mature recommerce business can jointly produce. This is why I am holding the long-term growth assumption down at 4%.

🎓 Clarity Why does an acquisition "flatter" growth for one year? When a company buys another business part-way through a year, only those few months count in that first year's revenue. The following year, the acquired business is owned for all twelve months — so its revenue contribution jumps, even if the acquired business itself isn't growing at all. That creates a one-off "annualisation" boost to headline growth. To see the real, underlying ("organic" or "like-for-like") growth, you strip the acquisition out of both years and compare what's left — which is exactly what reveals AO's true growth was nearer 3.6% than 11.4%.

Shareholder Returns and the Balance Sheet

Since 2021, shares in issue have been diluted by around 16%. However, there was a slight concentration in the last twelve months: the company announced a new shareholder return in these results — a 10% special dividend plus a £10m buyback, completed back in March. All the good figures meant the company swung from net debt of £35.9m to net funds of £16.4m. Inventories held steady at £87.4m, trade receivables flat at £105.5m, and cash increased to £81.3m. With no dramatic increase in long-term borrowing, net asset value rose 21.4% from £144.5m to £175.5m. I don't judge the company too much on net asset value, but it is indicative that the position improved.

Revenue and gross margin (FY 2020–2025)

Source: AO World annual reports. Revenue has been a rollercoaster — a COVID peak of £1,661m, then three years of decline, now recovering. But the encouraging story is the gross margin (gold), climbing steadily from 17.0% to over 24% — the pivot to profit and cash generation.

Financial History

Six-year financial history

MetricFY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Turnover (£m)1,0461,6611,3681,1391,0391,138
Turnover % change+15.9%+58.8%−17.6%−16.8%−8.7%+9.5%
Operating profit (£m)(4)30(8)133644
Gross margin17.0%17.6%19.3%20.9%23.4%24.3%
Pre-tax profit (£m)(1)20(11)83429
Post-tax profit (£m)117(3)62510
Reported EPS (p)0.23.7(0.8)1.14.11.6
Net borrowing (£m)9928134763136
NAV (£m)709873106138145

Revenue has been a rollercoaster since 2021. FY 2021 hit 58.8% turnover growth to a high of £1.661bn during COVID (this is an online-only business, so the pandemic was a huge tailwind), followed by three years of decline, then +9.5% and +11.4% this year. The current £1.266bn is still well below that £1.661bn COVID peak. The encouraging story is the gross margin, which has climbed steadily from 17.0% to over 24% — the pivot to profit and cash generation is evident.

My Concerns

I have a big question mark on AO World, as always, because they are in a very competitive marketplace. You have Currys selling huge volumes in store, and Amazon doing a very good job online. Those are two different positions, and AO is caught between them. Amazon will always pull in huge customer numbers and compress product prices, so AO will always struggle to improve margins on that front — and they have to pay to be seen, in a way that Amazon simply doesn't, because Amazon is the default online store with the ease, convenience, ratings and delivery options. That is a dangerous squeeze position.

I've commented in the past that it's interesting AO hasn't tried to link up more specifically with other companies. I think they should be progressing ideas about getting onto the high street via franchise arrangements — having a presence within high-street shops to sell their products and drive people to their website. I'm not aware of them going down that route, but that's what I personally think they should do to extend their presence across the country.

Nonetheless, these are some blinding figures from a company I haven't been impressed with in recent times. They really have got their act together on profitability.

Valuation

My core concern feeds straight into the growth rate. Their core business isn't really progressing, they already have a huge online presence, and they can only grow as fast as the general market — plus the uncertainty over how much of this year's jump is the one-off Music Magpie annualisation. So I'm being cautious. I'm giving earnings per share of 6.36p and being generous with a growth rate of 4% (somewhere in the middle: Music Magpie has helped, but there are real struggles with core sales rates). I'm applying a 20% risk factor — we roughly know what's going on and where they're heading — and no uplift or reduction.

VALUATION SNAPSHOT

MetricFigure
Current share price93.80p
Shares in issue555.60m
Market capitalisation£521.2m
Earnings per share (FY 2026)6.36p
Price-to-earnings ratio (trailing)14.7x
Growth rate4%
Valuation multiple8x
Valuation uplift / reduction0%
Formula valuation67.16p
Actual valuation67.16p
Valued market capitalisation£373.2m
Value opportunity−28.4%
Risk factor20%
Probability50%
Proposed actionSell

This gives an actual valuation of 67.16p against a current share price of 93.80p — a negative value opportunity of −28.4%. That's not a huge surprise to me; AO has had a tendency to be overvalued, in my opinion. On the back of these growth figures, someone could argue that if the company can sustain a long-term growth rate above 10.5%, then it is fair value. But I think they will struggle to expand sales.

AO World (AO.) — share price (last 12 months, pence)

Source: London Stock Exchange data. Current price around 93.80p. Red dashed line shows my 67.16p valuation, below the current price.

Risks and What Could Go Wrong (for the Sell case)

Bottom Line — Sell

Credit where it's due: these are blinding figures from a company I haven't been impressed with in recent times. They've genuinely got their act together on profitability — record adjusted profit, a clean statutory result, and a swing to net cash.

But strip out the Music Magpie annualisation and underlying growth was only ~3.6%, and that tailwind won't repeat. AO remains caught between Currys in-store and Amazon online — a structural squeeze that caps growth. At a −28.4% value opportunity, the price simply runs ahead of what I think this business can sustainably deliver.

Sell. Value opportunity: −28.4%. Probability: 50%.

Sources & Further Reading

Disclaimer: This article is for information and education only and is not financial advice. I am not a financial adviser. Investing involves risk, including loss of capital. Do your own research and consider seeking independent advice.