Company
Computacenter
Ticker
CCC
Probability
26%
Value Opportunity
−71.4%
26 June 2026 · FY 2025 Results (year ending 31 December 2025)
Research GradeC — SELL

Selling More, Earning Less

Computacenter PLC — a large-scale technology reseller with an attached IT services arm, selling to large corporations and the public sector. All figures in pounds sterling.

Briefing

Business Model

Computacenter is a technology and services provider, marketing primarily to large corporations and the public sector. At heart it is a large-scale technology reseller — it buys hardware and software from manufacturers and sells it on to big organisations — with an attached IT services arm (professional services and managed services) bolted on top. The reselling generates enormous volume at thin margins; the services side is smaller but more profitable.

Revenue and Profitability

Revenues have oscillated a bit over recent times but, in general, have not really been heading downwards. FY 2021 saw a negative period of −7.5%, which we can largely forgive given the lockdown impacts of the COVID pandemic. Things bounced back dramatically in FY 2022, with revenue growth of 28.5% to £6.471bn. FY 2023 saw sales rise 7.0% to £6.923bn, FY 2024 was nearly flat at +0.6% to £6.965bn, and then FY 2025 saw a sudden jump again — revenue up 32% to £9.194bn. Interestingly, I saw something similar recently with Softcat, which operates in a very similar space.

Their gross margins are reasonably poor — which is what I would anticipate in a sector like this — but they were especially low this year, hitting 12.4% in FY 2025, the lowest in over five years. Generally they have oscillated around 14–15%. Profitability has remained reasonably flat year on year, although FY 2025 did see post-tax profit reduce from £172m to £157m. That meant earnings per share went down for the second year in a row.

Revenue and gross margin (FY 2020–2025)

Source: Computacenter annual reports. The "selling more, earning less" story in one chart: revenue (navy) surged 32% to £9.19bn, yet gross margin (gold) fell to 12.4% — its lowest in over five years.

🎓 Clarity Why does a falling gross margin matter when sales are booming? Gross margin is the percentage of each pound of sales left over after the direct cost of the goods sold. For a reseller, it's structurally low — they buy hardware and sell it on for a relatively small mark-up. When Computacenter's revenue jumps a third but its gross margin falls to 12.4%, it means the extra sales are coming from the least profitable activity (bulk hardware) rather than the more profitable one (services). So the company is handling far more volume, and taking on more risk and working capital to do it, without the profit growing to match. Big top-line growth that comes with shrinking margins is exactly the kind of growth that flatters the headline but doesn't reach the bottom line.

Financial History

Six-year financial history

MetricFY 2020FY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024FY 2025
Turnover (£m)5,4415,0356,4716,9236,9659,194
Turnover % change+7.7%−7.5%+28.5%+7.0%+0.6%+32.0%
Operating profit (£m)206263269272247265
Gross margin13.2%17.2%14.6%15.1%14.9%12.4%
Pre-tax profit (£m)193249251267243250
Post-tax profit (£m)154187184199172157
Reported EPS (p)133.8160.9159.1173.2152.9145.5
Adjusted EPS (p)126.4165.6169.7174.8159.9175.1
DPS (p)50.766.367.970.070.774.6
Net funds (£m)5195117344353426
% profit on turnover2.7%3.8%3.0%2.9%2.6%2.0%
🎓 Clarity Reported vs adjusted earnings per share — why two numbers? Reported (statutory) earnings per share is the official figure under accounting rules. Adjusted earnings per share strips out one-off items management considers non-recurring. This year the two diverge sharply: reported earnings per share fell 4.8% to 145.5p, dragged down by a £20.2m impairment (a one-off writedown of an asset's value), while adjusted earnings per share actually rose 9.5% to 175.1p. So the underlying trading was better than the headline "earnings down two years running" suggests. My valuation deliberately uses the lower, conservative reported figure of 145.5p — but it's only fair to flag that the adjusted read is more flattering.

Dividend and Balance Sheet

Dividends rose again last year despite profits slipping — baffling on the face of it, but in line with what a lot of companies seem to prioritise currently (dividend per share up to 74.6p). Even so, the yield is low at 1.8%, and given slipping profitability I would wonder whether they can really offer anything greater. Borrowing, though, is at a good level: net funds (negative net borrowing) of £426m positive. So the balance sheet is genuinely strong — that's the clear positive in this story.

Where the Revenue Comes From — by Segment

The business splits into two reporting segments. The FY 2025 picture shows exactly where the volume — and the margin pressure — sits:

Segment revenue (FY 2025)

SegmentFY 2025 revenueGrowthCharacter
Technology Sourcing£7.5bn+41% (42.7% cc)Hardware/software reselling; low margin
Services£1.7bn+3.2% (2.9% cc)Professional +8.8%; Managed declined
Group total£9.19bn+32%Gross margin 12.4%

All the growth is in the low-margin line (£bn)

Source: Computacenter FY2025 results; FY2024 segment figures derived from stated growth rates. Technology Sourcing (navy) ballooned ~£2.2bn while Services (gold) barely moved — the entire revenue surge is in the lowest-margin part of the business.

The revenue surge is almost entirely Technology Sourcing — high-volume, low-margin hardware reselling — while the higher-margin Services arm grew only 3.2%. A shift in mix toward the low-margin segment is why group gross margin fell to 12.4% even as revenue jumped by a third. They are selling far more, but of the least profitable thing.

Sources: Computacenter FY2025 Final Results, 12 Mar 2026 (investors.computacenter.com); Sharecast; Computer Weekly/Microscope. "cc" = constant currency. Group invoiced income (GII — the total value of goods invoiced, including items where the company only books the commission) grew 31% to £13bn.

Where the Revenue Comes From — by Geography

Computacenter operates across several countries. The half-year picture shows North America as the clear engine:

Revenue by region (H1 2025, six months to 30 June)

RegionH1 2025 revenueDirection / note
North America£2,085.6mEngine of growth; profit nearly doubled; now c.39–40% of group operating profit
Germany£878.7mStable; public-sector recovery late in the year
UK£640.0mReturned to growth; AI data-centre projects
Western Europe (Fr/Be/Nl/Ch)£358.3mWeak; France the drag, small operating loss

Revenue by region (H1 2025, £m)

Source: Computacenter H1 2025 results; channelweb. North America (£2.09bn, almost entirely US at £2,042.3m) dwarfs the rest and now accounts for ~39% of group adjusted operating profit before central costs, up from 24% in 2024.

Why Did Revenue Grow So Much?

This is an AI-infrastructure story, and specifically a North American one. The 32% surge was driven overwhelmingly by North America Technology Sourcing, where the company grew networking and data-centre volumes with both enterprise and hyperscale (cloud) customers on the back of buoyant demand for AI-related infrastructure. The UK contribution also leaned on AI data-centre projects. It is not primarily a government/public-sector upgrade cycle — if anything public-sector demand in Germany and France was soft for much of the year. It is the AI build-out, sold as hardware.

Two corroborating signals. First, the product order backlog ended 2025 at a record £7.1bn, up 200.3% year on year in constant currency, driven by Technology Sourcing order intake in North America and the UK — so the AI-hardware demand is sitting in the pipeline for 2026 too. Second, the company even ran a temporary North American facility holding £137.7m of inventory at year-end to support a single major data-centre programme.

Source: Computacenter FY2025 results and CEO commentary (Mike Norris); joshthompson.co.uk analysis.

What Matters for This Company

I don't think I'm going to investigate this company further. Their margins have always been a bit weak, but they seem especially low right now.

Since 11 February they've seen a 35% rise in share value, which I read as a market reaction to expectations of companies dramatically increasing infrastructure spend on AI requirements. But in any case, I don't really like where the company is heading. There is a lot not to like about business-to-business AI infrastructure: it is a squeezed area, and while this company can clearly achieve high total sales and do so profitably, its ability to make profit from those sales is slowly decreasing. I don't really see where this company — like other software and computer-service companies — is heading.

Valuation

I'm being a little generous here. I'm using the last reported earnings per share of 145.5p, a valuation multiple of 8x, and a growth rate of 2%. That is kinder than the company's recent record arguably deserves — earnings per share shrank 4.8% last year, and the two-year average is around −8.3% — but I suspect they will be able to achieve a 2% long-term growth rate, helped by the dramatic revenue rise. I then apply a 10% valuation reduction, because I don't like this whole infrastructure-reselling section: it's a squeezed area, and profitability is slowly eroding. I set a relatively low 15% risk factor, and — because I haven't researched the share heavily — a probability of 26%.

VALUATION SNAPSHOT

MetricFigure
Current share price4,248.00p
Shares in issue104.95m
Market capitalisation£4,458.2m
Earnings per share (reported, FY 2025)145.50p
Price-to-earnings ratio (trailing, reported)29.2x
Growth rate2%
Valuation multiple8x
Dividend yield1.8%
Valuation reduction−10%
Formula valuation1,350.24p
Actual valuation1,215.22p
Valued market capitalisation£1,275.3m
Value opportunity−71.4%
Risk factor15%
Research gradeC
Probability26%
Proposed actionSell

This gives an actual valuation of 1,215.22p against a current share price of 4,248.00p — a value opportunity of −71.4%. On these conservative inputs the shares look dramatically overvalued.

I should stress the obvious counter: the market is paying a trailing price-to-earnings ratio of around 24x (on adjusted earnings) precisely because it is capitalising the AI-infrastructure growth story, whereas my valuation deliberately refuses to extrapolate a low-margin hardware surge into durable earnings. If the AI-hardware demand proves both large and lasting — the £7.1bn backlog is the bull's exhibit A — my 2% growth assumption will look far too cautious. But on the quality of the earnings as they stand — thinning margins, falling reported earnings per share, growth concentrated in the least profitable line — I am comfortable being cautious.

Computacenter (CCC) — share price (last 12 months, pence)

Source: London Stock Exchange data. The shares are up around 35% since 11 February on the AI-infrastructure spending story. Red dashed line shows my 1,215.22p valuation, far below the current price.

Risks and What Could Go Wrong (for the Sell case)

Bottom Line — Sell

Computacenter has just posted a blockbuster revenue figure — up 32% to £9.19bn — but it's the wrong kind of growth. It came almost entirely from low-margin hardware reselling on the AI build-out, group gross margin fell to a five-year low of 12.4%, and reported earnings per share dropped for a second straight year. They're selling far more, but of the least profitable thing.

The balance sheet is strong and the backlog is genuinely impressive — and if the AI-hardware demand proves durable, I'll have been too cautious. But on the quality of earnings as they stand, and on a deliberately conservative valuation, the shares look dramatically overvalued at −71.4%. I don't like where B2B infrastructure reselling is heading, and I won't be looking at this one further.

Sell. Value opportunity: −71.4%. Probability: 26%. Research grade: C.

Sources & Further Reading

Disclaimer: This article is for information and education only and is not financial advice. I am not a financial adviser. Investing involves risk, including loss of capital. Do your own research and consider seeking independent advice.