Cheap on Paper, But Show Me the Like-for-Like Growth
Briefing
- Thesis: JD Sports released FY 2026 results showing solid revenue growth of 10.5% to £12.7 billion, driven largely by the full-year contributions from Hibbett and Courir. But organic revenue growth was a more modest 2.1%, like-for-like sales declined 2.1%, and adjusted earnings per share fell for the third consecutive year to 11.71p. The company has relied on acquisitions to grow while organic profitability per share has been eroding.
- Valuation view: Using reported earnings per share of 8.50p with a conservative 3% growth rate and no valuation discount, I arrive at a valuation of approximately 84.3p. Against a current price of 68.5p, the value opportunity is +23.2%.
- Key risk: Like-for-like sales have been negative, margins are compressing, and FY 2027 guidance points to a further profit decline (profit before tax guided at £750–850 million versus £852 million in FY 2026).
- Key catalyst: Free cash flow improved 36% to £462 million and the balance sheet is healthier with net cash of £311 million. The £100 million share buyback programme at current depressed prices is meaningful.
- Overall stance: Hold. At 68.5p with a trailing price-to-earnings ratio of 5.9x, the stock is optically cheap — but I want to see like-for-like improvement before committing.
Business Model
JD Sports Fashion is one of the world's largest omnichannel retailers of sports fashion brands. Founded in Bury in 1981, the company operates approximately 4,870 stores globally across multiple fascias. The core brand is JD, complemented by a growing portfolio of "Complementary Concepts" — regional athletic retailers acquired to extend geographic reach.
The business model centres on curating and retailing premium sports fashion footwear and apparel from brands including Nike, Adidas, Jordan, New Balance, and others. JD differentiates through exclusive product allocations from key brand partners, particularly Nike and Jordan, which rely on JD's ability to connect with younger, fashion-conscious consumers.
Geographically, the group has shifted significantly through acquisitions. North America now accounts for approximately 40% of group revenue, up from around 32% two years ago, primarily driven by the Hibbett and DTLR/Shoe Palace acquisitions. Europe (including the UK) accounts for approximately 50%, with Asia Pacific and the rest of the world making up the remainder.
FY 2026 Results
Key financials
| Metric | FY 2026 | FY 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | £12,662m | £11,458m | +10.5% (+11.7% cc) |
| Organic revenue growth (cc) | +2.1% | — | — |
| Like-for-like sales | −2.1% | — | — |
| Gross margin | 47.0% | 47.0% | Flat |
| Operating profit (adjusted) | £886m | £937m | −5.4% |
| Operating margin (adjusted) | 7.0% | 8.2% | −120bps |
| Profit before tax (pre-adjusting) | £852m | £923m | −7.7% |
| Statutory profit before tax | £629m | £715m | −12.0% |
| Adjusted basic earnings per share | 11.71p | 12.39p | −5.5% |
| Dividend per share | 1.20p | 1.00p | +20% |
| Free cash flow | £462m | £339m | +36.3% |
| Net cash (before leases) | £311m | £52m | +£259m |
Sales are up 11.7% on a constant currency basis which is good. But the growth is largely a result of the full-year contribution from Hibbett (acquired July 2024) and Courir (acquired November 2024). Organic sales growth was a more modest +2.1%, and critically, like-for-like sales declined 2.1%. That underlying softness is a concern.
The Earnings Per Share Problem
The earnings per share trajectory is worth flagging. Despite revenue nearly doubling since FY 2022 (from £8.6 billion to £12.7 billion), adjusted earnings per share has actually declined from 12.8p to 11.7p. The adjusted figure has now declined for three consecutive years.
The company has relied on inorganic growth to fuel revenue increases, while organic profitability per share has been eroding. This is the central tension in the investment case.
The Acquisition Machine — Five Years of Dealmaking
JD Sports has been one of the most acquisitive retailers in the world over the past five years, spending approximately £1.9 billion on five major acquisitions. The strategy has been to build a global multi-brand platform, particularly expanding into the US and European markets through "Complementary Concepts" — regional athletic retailers that operate alongside the core JD fascia.
Major acquisitions (2021–2024)
| Brand | Year | Cost | Region | What They Got |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hibbett | 2024 | £870m ($1.1bn) | US — Southeast & Midwest | 1,169 stores, 36 US states |
| Courir | 2024 | £434m (€520m) | France & Europe | 323 stores, 6 countries, female-focused |
| DTLR Villa | 2021 | £360m ($495m) | US — East Coast | ~250 stores, streetwear focus |
| Shoe Palace | 2021 | £235m ($325m) | US — West Coast | ~170 stores, sneaker specialist |
| Leisure Lakes Bikes | 2022 | ~£10m (est.) | UK | Cycling retail, 7 stores |
Acquisition spend by brand (£m equivalent)
Source: JD Sports RNS announcements, company presentations. Values converted to GBP at approximate transaction-date rates. Total spend: approximately £1.9 billion across five major acquisitions in four years.
The acquisitions are strategically sound — Hibbett fills the Southeast and Midwest US, DTLR covers the East Coast, Shoe Palace the West Coast, and Courir extends into the largest sneaker market in Europe. But they need to translate into organic improvement, not just headline revenue growth with declining earnings per share.
Revenue and operating profit (FY 2020–2026)
Source: JD Sports annual reports. Revenue has doubled from £6.1bn to £12.7bn in six years, but operating profit peaked at £1,060m (FY 2023) and has since declined to £886m despite the revenue growth. This illustrates the margin compression problem.
FY 2027 Guidance
FY 2027 outlook
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Profit before tax (before adjusting items) | £750m–£850m |
| Implied change versus FY 2026 (£852m) | −12% to flat |
| Q1 FY 2027 like-for-like sales | −2.3% |
| Market environment | "Muted market growth" expected |
The company is guiding for a probable downgrade in profitability. The midpoint of £800 million would be 6% below FY 2026. This reflects continued weak consumer sentiment, cautious purchasing behaviour, and ongoing pressures in the footwear cycle from expiring product cycles at major brand partners.
Valuation
Using the reported earnings per share of 8.50p and applying a conservative 3% growth rate — deliberately cautious given the FY 2027 guidance of a potential profit decline and the uncertain macro backdrop — with a valuation multiple of 8x and no valuation discount, I arrive at an implied value of 84.3p.
VALUATION SNAPSHOT
| Metric | Figure |
|---|---|
| Current share price | 68.5p |
| Shares in issue | 4,813m |
| Market capitalisation | £3,293m |
| Earnings per share (reported, FY 2026) | 8.50p |
| Trailing price-to-earnings ratio | 5.9x |
| Growth rate | 3% |
| Valuation multiple | 8x |
| Dividend yield | 1.8% |
| Valuation uplift / reduction | 0% |
| Formula valuation | 84.3p |
| Valued capitalisation | £4,056m |
| Value opportunity | +23.2% |
| Risk factor | 20% |
| Probability | 50% |
| Proposed action | Hold |
The 23.2% value opportunity is moderate. At 68.5p the stock is trading on a trailing price-to-earnings ratio of just 5.9x on reported earnings, which is optically cheap for a business of this scale and quality.
JD Sports (JD.) — share price (last 12 months)
Source: London Stock Exchange data. Current price 68.5p. Gold dashed line shows my 84.3p valuation.
Risks and What Could Go Wrong
- Like-for-like sales decline persisting: LFL sales were −2.1% in FY 2026 and −2.3% in Q1 FY 2027. If this doesn't improve, no amount of acquisitions will fix the underlying business.
- Margin compression: Operating margin has fallen from 8.2% to 7.0% in a single year. FY 2027 guidance suggests further decline.
- Acquisition integration risk: Approximately £1.9 billion spent on acquisitions in four years is a lot of integration to manage simultaneously. If Hibbett or Courir underperform, the capital deployed will not generate adequate returns.
- Nike product cycle dependency: JD relies heavily on Nike and Jordan for exclusive allocations. Expiring product cycles at brand partners are already pressuring footwear demand.
- Consumer sentiment: The Iranian crisis, higher inflation, and uncertain interest rate direction are all weighing on discretionary retail spending.
- Adjusted versus reported earnings gap: Adjusted earnings per share of 11.71p versus reported 8.63p — a meaningful gap driven by acquisition-related charges that are likely to persist.
What Would Change My Mind
- Like-for-like sales returning to positive: This is the single most important metric. If LFL turns positive for two consecutive quarters, it would signal genuine organic momentum.
- Operating margin stabilising above 8%: A return to FY 2025 margin levels would demonstrate that the cost base is under control despite the acquisitions.
- Share price below 55p: At lower prices, the value opportunity widens significantly and the buyback programme becomes even more accretive.
- Hibbett integration delivering $25 million synergies on schedule: Proof that the US acquisitions are generating the promised cost savings would validate the strategy.
- Nike product cycle refresh: A strong new product cycle from Nike and Jordan would directly drive footfall and demand at JD stores globally.
Conclusion — Hold
The share price decline reflects real operational challenges: declining like-for-like sales, compressing margins, and a cautious outlook for FY 2027.
At 68.5p, with a price-to-earnings ratio of 5.9x on reported earnings, the stock is cheap on an absolute basis. The 3% growth rate in my model is deliberately conservative — if the business returns to historical growth rates, the upside would be significantly greater.
But I want to see the like-for-like improvement before committing. Show me the organic growth.
Value opportunity: +23.2%. Probability: 50%.