Company
Greggs
Ticker
GRG
Probability
40%
Value Opportunity
−9.4%
5 August 2026 · Interim Results (26 weeks ended 27 June 2026)
Research GradeA — HOLD

Well Run, Fully Priced

Interim results for the 26 weeks ended 27 June 2026, published 29 July 2026. All figures in pounds sterling.

Briefing

Business Model

Greggs is the UK’s largest food-to-go retailer, selling bakery items, savouries, sandwiches and hot drinks through a mostly company-owned shop estate. It is vertically integrated — it manufactures and distributes its own product from its own bakeries and distribution centres, which is where the strong gross margin comes from.

Revenue arrives through three routes, and the distinction matters for everything that follows: company-managed shops (the bulk of sales); the business-to-business channel, covering franchised shops (in travel hubs and forecourts, run by partners like Primark and forecourt operators) plus the newer grocery retail partnerships selling Greggs-branded product through Tesco and Iceland; and home delivery via Just Eat and Uber Eats.

The Half in Numbers

Greggs put out its interim update on 29 July, bringing the results up to 27 June. Total sales rose from £1,027.7m to £1,101.5m — an increase of 7.2%, which seems fairly impressive to me, albeit like-for-like sales in the company-managed shops were up only 2.1% (and 1.3% in the franchised shops). The board’s expectations for the full year are unchanged.

Interim results — H1 2026 vs prior years

MetricH1 2026H1 2025H1 2024Change
Total sales£1,101.5m£1,027.7m£960.6m+7.2%
Like-for-like sales (company-managed)+2.1%+2.6%
Gross margin62.01%61.47%+54bp
Operating profit£86.5m£70.4m£75.8m+22.9%
Pre-tax profit£76.0m£63.5m£74.1m+19.7%
Basic earnings per share55.1p45.6p+20.8%
Interim dividend19.0p19.0p19.0pFlat
Net cash£15.9m(£12.8m)
Shops at period end2,773+34 net in H1

Pre-tax profit of £76.0m is only £1.9m above where it stood two years ago in the first half of 2024. The 19.7% increase is a recovery against a soft period — 2025 was a difficult year for them. The company says so itself: profit growth reflects the soft comparator, growth in the grocery business, strong cost control and the phasing of cost inflation. Cost inflation ran at just 2.2% in the half, which helps explain the margin improvement, and they’ve delivered £7m of the £11m of structural cost savings targeted for the year.

Where the 7.2% Sales Increase Came From

Bar chart showing the sources of Greggs first-half sales growth: like-for-like +£18.3m, new and relocated shops +£34.3m, business-to-business +£21.2m
Decomposition of the £73.8m of additional first-half sales. Source: Greggs interim results, 29 July 2026.

Of the £73.8m of additional sales: £18.3m came from like-for-like growth in the company-managed shops (the +2.1%); around £34.3m came from new and relocated company shops net of closures; and £21.2m came from the business-to-business channel — franchise sales plus the grocery retail partnerships — which grew 18.2% to £137.5m.

So roughly a quarter of the growth is same-store trading, nearly half is estate expansion, and close to a third is the business-to-business channel. Like-for-like sales aren’t really backing up the growth by normal means — it’s growth by opening more stores and by pushing product through partners’ shelves. The business-to-business channel is also the more profitable: its trading profit rose 24.5% to £38.1m, a 27.7% margin on its revenue against 12.5% in company-managed retail.

🎓 Clarity What are “like-for-like” sales, and why do they matter so much? Like-for-like (or “LFL”) sales measure only shops that have been open for the full comparison period — stripping out anything new. It answers the crucial question: is the existing business actually selling more? Total sales can rise simply because a company opened more shops, which costs capital and eventually runs out of good locations. Like-for-like growth is the healthier, cheaper kind, because it comes from existing sites doing better. Greggs’ total sales rose 7.2% but like-for-like only 2.1% — so most of the growth is bought with new openings rather than earned in the shops it already had. That is the single most important tension in this note.

Estate Growth — the 3,500-Shop Question

The estate grew by 34 net openings in the first half, or 1.2%, to 2,773 shops — 65 gross openings (including 27 franchised units and 17 relocations) less 31 closures. They feel they still have the ability to reach 3,500 UK shops, which would be a 26% increase on the current estate, and the new Derby and Kettering distribution centres are being built to serve that.

They might say they have the opportunity to grow the estate significantly further, but I’d comment that on this half’s figures alone it would take them ten years to get to 3,500 — they’re not working very hard to reach that level of openings. In fairness to the company, they’re projecting a more productive second half: 100 to 110 net new shops for 2026 as a whole, plus around ten ‘Greggs Express’ self-service trials, and they expect to keep opening at least 100 net shops a year over the medium term. At that guided rate the 3,500 target is around seven years out — still a long time.

The character of the openings is changing, which matters for store saturation. Over half of new openings are now beyond the high street — petrol forecourts, supermarkets, retail parks, hospitals and university campuses — and 62% of the half’s new shops went into areas with no other Greggs within a mile (up from 53%). Where there is an existing shop nearby, the sales transfer has averaged under 5%.

They’re also trialling the smaller ‘bitesize Greggs’ format (four opened, four more due), the ‘Greggs Express’ self-service offer with a convenience franchise partner, and stations: Birmingham New Street has been relocated to a bigger unit, with Liverpool Lime Street, London Euston and London Victoria to come in the second half. And they’ve opened their first international travel hub shop, in Tenerife South Airport with Lagardère Travel Retail. I don’t really understand why they’ve bothered with that — I can’t imagine there’ll be a huge rush of demand for Greggs products at a single store in Tenerife, and it’s not even a major hub airport for properly testing general demand. The company says the first few weeks of trading there have been encouraging.

🎓 Clarity What is “cannibalisation” (or sales transfer)? When a chain opens a new shop close to one it already owns, some customers simply switch from the old shop to the new one. The company gains a shop but not much extra total revenue — it has effectively eaten its own sales, which is why it’s called cannibalisation. It is the central risk of expanding an already dense estate, and it’s why the two figures Greggs discloses matter: 62% of new shops went somewhere with no other Greggs within a mile, and where there was one nearby, the transfer averaged under 5%. Those numbers are the company’s evidence that there is still genuine white space left — the thing my scepticism about the 3,500 target ultimately hinges on.

The Estate on the Map

Interactive map — click and drag to pan, scroll to zoom, and click a marker for shop detail. All Greggs locations mapped in OpenStreetMap as at early August 2026 — 2,129 of the 2,773 shops (around 77% coverage; the gaps are mapping gaps, not trading gaps). Greggs doesn’t publish opening dates for individual shops, so the shops opened in the last twelve months can’t be reliably picked out in a different colour; the 34 first-half openings are described in the statement as skewed to forecourts, supermarkets, retail parks, hospitals and universities rather than high streets.

Coverage is already close to blanket — the North East heartland, Yorkshire, the Midlands, the central belt of Scotland, London and South Wales are all dense — and I’m just a bit aware that they already have very good coverage across the United Kingdom. Where realistically are they going to roll out more and more stores?

The company’s answer is: forecourts, travel hubs, and smaller formats in locations a full shop can’t justify. That’s a credible answer for a few hundred more sites; whether it stretches to 727 more is possibly questionable, and their current rate of expansion concerns me. If they truly believe there is space for the brand in so many locations, I would expect them to be rolling out stores faster.

Grocery Retailing — What Has It Actually Achieved?

The interim results talk up the grocery channel but don’t give volumes or revenues for it, and that remains the case right through their statement — grocery sits inside the business-to-business segment alongside franchise sales, with no separate split.

What can be said with numbers: the business-to-business channel as a whole grew 18.2% (£21.2m) in the half and its trading profit rose 24.5%, and the company names the grocery business as one of the drivers of the profit improvement. What they describe: the ‘Bake-at-Home’ range launched in Tesco in September 2025 and has since expanded in range and distribution; the Iceland range has been extended, including Margherita and Pepperoni pizzas; the Vegan Sausage Roll has gone into larger Tesco stores and two products into Tesco’s smaller formats.

Selling into the retail space is where I’d see greater potential value than international expansion.

Delivery

Home delivery made up 6.9% of the sales mix in the first half, up slightly from 6.8% a year earlier, and three-quarters of company-managed shops now sell via Just Eat and Uber Eats. I find this a little surprising, as the company’s products don’t really strike me as the obvious purchase from home — but 6.9% of sales from effectively nothing, sales that wouldn’t be achieved elsewhere, is good.

The basket value of a delivery order runs around three times a walk-in purchase, the evening is where the delivery market is strongest, and the company has adapted products to suit the channel — the boxed pizzas being the clear example.

Margins, Costs and Profit

Gross margin strengthened marginally to 62.01%, which I’d deem reasonably good given the general headwinds on company costs over this period. Distribution and selling costs and administrative expenses stayed roughly in line as a share of sales, which meant operating profit increased 22.9% to £86.5m — a very good result — and basic earnings per share rose 20.8% to 55.1p. Very good, and especially welcome given earnings per share were significantly lower in 2025 than 2024.

Two cautions for the second half, both from the company’s own guidance: around £10m of extra operating costs land as the new Derby distribution centre goes live, and they state that second-half profits are expected to reduce year-on-year absent a recovery in the consumer backdrop. The first-half cost-saving tailwind is also expected to fade. July trading, for what it’s worth, accelerated and is running ahead of the company’s internal expectations as cooler weather brought customers back.

Financial History

Six-year financial history

MetricFY2020FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Turnover (£m)8111,2301,5131,8102,0142,151
Turnover % change−30.5%+51.6%+23.0%+19.6%+11.3%+6.8%
Operating profit (£m)(7)153154172195188
Gross margin63.0%63.6%62.0%60.7%61.7%61.5%
Pre-tax profit (£m)(14)146148168190172
Reported EPS (p)(12.9)114.3117.5139.2149.6119.3
Adjusted EPS (p)(12.9)114.3123.8137.5122.8
DPS (p)5759626969
Net borrowing (£m)25585110124290404
NAV (£m)322429446531571625
Bar chart showing Greggs revenue growth slowing each year from 51.6% in 2021 to 6.8% in 2025, with H1 2026 at 7.2%
Revenue growth by year, with the first half of 2026 alongside. Source: tear sheet financial history; interim statement.

Revenue growth has slowed every single year since the reopening surge — 51.6%, 23.0%, 19.6%, 11.3%, 6.8% — and earnings per share have been under pressure, drifting down from the 2024 peak. This year’s 20% earnings recovery is great and all, but it’s a recovery, not a new trajectory.

What Matters for This Company

I think the company are very well run. They’re coming up with a lot of legitimate updates to the menu, the store expansion is disciplined, and they’re one of the few retailers of their sort that keeps pushing out good numbers in a difficult market — taking share of visits (up 0.3 points to 8.7%) while the wider food-to-go market shrank.

But the like-for-like increases aren’t really backing up growth by normal means — it’s growth by opening more stores — and at some stage I have to query how many more stores you can realistically roll out, given the coverage they already have.

I don’t think the offering lends itself naturally to international expansion; if it did, the sensible route would be high-footfall core locations and major airport hubs in Europe — just not Tenerife — and translating the Greggs brand for an international market is a big ask. Of greater potential value is selling into the retail space, Tesco and the like. Into the longer term, I’m not sure they can keep up this year’s level of profit growth, and the slowing revenue history supports that concern.

Valuation

I’m not basing this on the full-year earnings per share figure itself, but on an expectation that the full-year figure comes in about 15% higher than a year ago, which gives an earnings override of 141.22p per share. I’m applying a growth rate of 7% — which might be a little harsh on a company that’s just pulled out a 20% earnings increase, but I sense that pace won’t continue into the longer term — with a valuation multiple of 8, no uplift or reduction, and a 20% risk factor.

One thing to be aware of on the override: the company itself guides second-half profits to reduce year-on-year as the Derby costs land, and a 15% full-year increase implies the second half growing around 11% — so the override embeds a stronger second half than management’s own guidance.

🎓 Clarity What is an “earnings override”? My valuation normally starts from the last reported full-year earnings per share. But Greggs is mid-year, and last year’s figure (119.3p) reflects a weak period that the business has already moved past — using it would undervalue where the company actually is. So instead I substitute, or “override”, that figure with my own estimate of where full-year earnings will land: 15% up on last year, giving 141.22p. It’s a forward-looking input rather than a historic fact, which makes it the single most important assumption in the valuation — and the one most worth arguing with. Note it sits above what management’s own second-half guidance implies, so if anything it is the generous choice.

VALUATION SNAPSHOT

MetricFigure
Current share price1,946.00p
Shares in issue101.96m
Market capitalisation£1,984.0m
Earnings per share (override, FY2026e)141.22p
Price-to-earnings ratio (on override)13.8x
Growth rate7%
Valuation multiple8x
Dividend yield3.5%
Valuation uplift / reduction0%
Formula valuation1,762.43p
Actual valuation1,762.43p
Valued market capitalisation£1,796.8m
Value opportunity−9.4%
Risk factor20%
Research gradeA
Probability40%
Proposed actionHold

Greggs (GRG) — share price (last 12 months, pence)

Indicative share price path over the last twelve months; current price 1,946.00p per the tear sheet. Gold dashed line shows my 1,762.43p valuation, sitting modestly below the price.

This gives a valuation of 1,762.43p against a current share price of 1,946.00p — a value opportunity of −9.4%. The shares sit modestly above what I’d pay: the market is capitalising this year’s earnings recovery at close to 16 times, while the underlying growth engine is store openings into an already well-covered map, with slowing revenue growth behind it and a guided softer second half ahead. A well-run company at a slightly full price.

Risks and What Could Go Wrong

What Would Change My Mind

Bottom Line — Hold

Greggs is a very well-run company. It is taking share while its market shrinks, holding a 62% gross margin through a cost-inflation period, controlling costs well, and delivering a 20.8% rise in earnings per share. There is a lot to admire here.

But the growth is bought rather than earned: like-for-like is only 2.1%, and roughly half the sales increase came from opening shops into a map that already looks close to full. Revenue growth has slowed every year since 2021, this year’s earnings jump is a recovery against a soft comparator, and management itself guides a weaker second half. At −9.4% the shares sit modestly above what I’d pay.

Hold. Value opportunity: −9.4%. Probability: 40%. Research grade: A.

Sources & Method

Disclaimer: This article is for information and education only and is not financial advice. I am not a financial adviser. Investing involves risk, including loss of capital. Do your own research and consider seeking independent advice.